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Abstract: Article describes the most common methods for evaluation of physical protection systems. 
It analyzes various software simulations and describes how mathematical model can be 
used for evaluation and designing of physical protection systems and how it can provide 
a basis for software simulation that could upgrade possibilities and extend the scope of 
previous software. Author is focusing on the selection of the best approaches from the 
evaluation of physical protection systems designed for nuclear facilities and how these 
approaches can be used in evaluation of physical protection systems designed for the 
protection of property, persons and tangible assets.
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Introduction 
Protection system is a tool for the enforcement of 
a security policy (Reitšpís, 2004). One of the main 
responsibilities of protection system is to secure the 
system from violation of intruder. It is necessary to 
maximize the probability of intruder's detection in 
vital area and delay the intruder in the vital area as 
long as possible, so response force can move to the 
object and make intervention.
This article focuses on physical security, so we 
use the term physical protection system. This term is 
closely related to the protection of nuclear facilities 
(Loveček, 2004). Most of software simulation was 
made for evaluation of nuclear facilities.
However, we want to fi nd the best developed 
approaches that can be used for the evaluating of 
systems that protect property, persons and tangible 
assets. Compared to nuclear facilities, these 
protection systems have different composition of 
security zones, so other techniques are necessary to 
fulfi ll the objectives. 
The motivation for writing this article is to fi nd 
the best approaches from existing mathematical 
models that can suit the modeling of systems used 
for the protection of various assets.
Materials and methods
Many studies have been carried out about 
the most often used methods, such as SAVI and 
ASSESS. In other cases we had to use limited 
sources, particularly for methods that are still in 
the development stage. For example, in the case of 
SATANO software, we used only the source code 
of application and one doctoral thesis related to this 
topic.
Because we based our research on existing 
particular solutions, the basic scientifi c method we 
used is the inductive generalization. We generalized 
various conclusions based on our particular fi ndings.
Many times we also used method of comparison 
for comparing various approaches or we had to 
analyze various aspects in depth. Very common 
technique for the analyzing of security system is 
sensitivity analysis, because the exclusive usage of 
output parameters is very often diffi cult to interpret.
Results
During research, we analyzed various practical 
solutions that have been implemented in the past. As 
a review of our fi ndings, we provide the analysis of 
various parameters and software simulations.
The most often used parameters for evaluation are:
• probability of interruption,
• probability of intruders elimination,
• index of security measures.
Basically, the index of security measures is 
a ratio between the shortest time of intruder's 
advance through vital area and the time of tactical 
unit intervention (Loveček, 2009). Probability of 
interruption is the probability that a response force 
will interrupt adversary before intruder’s task is 
completed (Jang, 2009) Probability of intruder’s 
elimination is the probability, that an intruder will 
be successfully eliminated by response force (Rybár, 
2000).
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SATANO (Faculty of Special 
Engineering, University of Žilina)
Software SATANO implements four closely 
related models that were created together:
• Pragmatic model,
• Optimistic model,
• Pessimistic model,
• Realistic model.
The output of these models is the effi ciency of 
protection system based on calculations of the index 
of security measures. Some of these models use the 
shortest path; others use the most probable path. 
Dijkstra algorithm is used for the calculation of the 
shortest path (Loveček, 2005).
These models are suitable for the calculation of 
the most probable time of physical protection system 
overcoming with the simulation of various types of 
situations, such as:
• Intruder has/doesn’t have information about the 
shortest path,
• Background (visibility, traffi c) is/isn’t favorable.
Fig. 1 Input matrix of GUI in SATANO
Fig. 2 GUI of SATANO
Input values can be defi ned as fi xed values, 
normal distribution of probability can be used 
(Loveček, 2005). The matrix type of graphical user 
interface was used, so two different security zones 
could be connected only with a single join.
Such approach can be sometimes insuffi cient. 
For example, two rooms can be connected by several 
elements (wall, doors) and the selection of element 
with the lowest breaching endurance time can be 
tricky, because result can depend on the chosen set 
of intruder’s tools.
EASI, ASD, SAVI (Sandia National 
Laboratories)
These three methods are based on the probability 
of interruption and they are intended for the evaluation 
of protection system security in nuclear facilities. 
They use central distribution of security zones. The 
intruder has all the information about security system 
(Phillips, 2004). The detection before critical point of 
detection is known as early detection.
EASI method (Estimation of Adversary Sequence 
Interruption) is used for the calculation of the 
probability of interruption on one (predefi ned) path. 
In the graphical method called ASD, various 
layers are used for simulating the barriers that 
separate the intruder from his aim in the central zone.
SAVI method combines EASI and ASD methods 
and calculates the probability of interruption for 
all the paths to central zone and selects 10 most 
vulnerable zones. (SAVI, 1994) One component of 
SAVI is the database of the most often used barriers 
and detectors.
SAVI method implements also the analysis 
of sensitivity. RFT time is used as a basis for this 
analysis, because it is the most critical factor. The 
output is the probability of interruption. Figure 4 
exhibits the sensitivity analysis for a path with the 
lowest probability of interruption. 
Drawback of SAVI is the absence of probability 
of intruder’s elimination. 
ASSESS (Sandia National Laboratories)
ASSESS method (Analytic System and 
Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) 
is an enhanced method based on SAVI. Additional 
modules for the calculation of probability of external 
and internal intruder’s elimination are used.
ASSESS also uses the probability of interruption 
and ASD method as basic methods (Phillips, 2004). 
ASSESS has also a new structure that consist of six 
independent modules.
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Fig. 4 Analysis of interruption (Analýza, 1991)
SAPE (Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Control)
SAPE (Systematic Analysis Of Physical 
Protection Effectiveness) is based on SAVI and 
ASSESS methods, but it has additional features. 
SAPE doesn’t use ASD method, but 2D map instead.
Since ASD model is too simple to describe an 
arrangement of buildings, a facility map is required 
to imagine an adversary’s path. This insuffi cient 
description also causes inaccuracies. The ASD 
cannot show at what point along a fence it has been 
penetrated, and the distance needed to cross an area 
is considered equal when using the ASD, regardless 
of the particular route (Jang, 2009).
2D map has the following advantages compared 
to an ASD:
• It provides intuitive bird’s eye views of a physical 
protection system,
• It realistically represents the relative positions of 
protection elements (Jang, 2009).
SAPE uses another technique for sensitivity 
analysis. It is noted that SAVI shows a sensitivity 
graph of the probability of interruption according to 
response force time, while SAPE shows the sensitivity 
values to all protection elements located on a path.
This sensitivity represents relative upgrade 
effi ciency, and hence higher sensitivity elements 
should be considered fi rst for 
upgrade (Jang, 2009).
Discussion
We found out that the most 
often used output parameters 
can be used also for the purposes 
of property, tangible assets and 
personal protection systems. 
However underlying modeling 
techniques and the composition of 
security zones has to be changed, 
because centralistic distribution is 
not suitable.
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Fig. 3 Vital area (left) and application of ASD (right) (Analýza, 1991)
Fig. 5 2D maps used in SAPE (Jang, 2009)
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approach should be based on additional scientifi c 
research on this topic.
Current methods prefer fully-mathematical 
modeling, but perhaps only because of limited 
opportunities of realistic modeling using virtual 
reality in times when the methods were created 
(some methods are dating back to the 70s and 80s).
Finding of the most probable path through vital 
area could be the preferred way because the securing 
of the most probable path is crucial. On the other 
hand, other (less probable paths) could remain 
defi ciently secured.
Conclusion
Based on analysis, we can conclude some 
important points. Above all, the existing models 
are not suitable for protection systems, that are 
not designed for protecting of nuclear facilities or 
similar objects (that use one central zone). Method 
that can evaluate systems with many security zones 
with protected assets is needed, but this method can 
be based on existing techniques, such as probability 
of interruption or index of security measures.
Important step in the usage of method in practice 
is to fi ll databases of breaching endurance times 
of various barriers from different vendors. The 
complexity of this problem is the main obstacle for 
further development and specialized studies need 
to be carried out. The method for the estimation of 
detection probability needs to be created. 
Main drawbacks of current methods can be 
divided into two groups:
• Problems with the model itself,
• Lack of input data.
Problems with the model depend on concrete 
model, but it is possible to formulate one common 
feature and that is the centralistic composition of 
models that is suitable for the evaluation of nuclear 
facilities but not suitable for property, persons and 
tangible assets protection systems.
Specifi c problem is the lack of input data that 
complicates the implementation of models. In 
systems for protection of property, persons and 
tangible assets, very wide group of detectors and 
barriers are used that enhance this problem.
Now we can defi ne two main objectives of the 
modeling of physical protection system:
• to effectively design physical protection system 
(the most vulnerable paths through vital area will 
be effectively protected),
• to optimize fi nancial costs spent on security, so 
various paths through vital area will be equally 
secured as long as there is the same amount of 
assets on various paths.
Method for evaluation can be fully-mathematical 
(method that will use path with the lowest probability 
of interruption) or can use virtual simulation with 
3D model of object for fi nding the most probable 
intruder’s path. Because both approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages, choosing the best 
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Transactions of the VŠB - Technical university of Ostrava
Safety Engineering Series 
Vol. VI, No. 2, 2011
31
References
A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security. (2005). Sandia Corporation, White Paper.
Analýza účinnosti systému bezpečnostní ochrany jaderných zařízení a jadrných materiálu. (1991). Ústav jaderných 
informácí.
JANG, S. (2009). Development of a Vulnerability Assessment Code for a Physical Protection System : Systematic 
Analysis of Physical Protection (SAPE). Nuclear Engineering and Technology, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2009.
LOVEČEK, T. (2005). Hodnotenie kvality bezpečnostných systémov. [Dizertačná práca]. Žilina.
LOVEČEK, T. (2009). Systémy ochrany majetku a možnosti ich kvalitatívneho a kvantitatívneho ohodnotenia. 
[Habilitačná práca]. Žilina.
PHILLIPS, G. (2004). New Vulnerability Assessment Technologies vs the Old VA Tools. New Meets Old. National 
Security Program Offi ce.
Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.
REITŠPÍS, J. (2004). Manžérstvo bezpečnostných rizík. Žilina: Edis, 2004. 296 s. ISBN 80-8070-328-0.
RYBÁR, M. (2000). Modelovanie a simulácia vo vojenstve. Bratislava: Vydavateľská a informačná agentúra, 
Ministerstvo obrany Slovenskej republiky, 2000. ISBN 80-88842-34-4.
SAVI 4.0 (1994). Reference manual, internal document, Sandia National Laboratories, 1994.
p. 27 - 31
